Moral Relativism

Lots of arguments in ethics try to persuade by analogy. They'll find a situation you agree with them about, and then try to convince you another situation is the same. Like this:

Most people think it would be wrong to walk by a baby drowning in a puddle without doing anything.

So, what about babies elsewhere in the world whose deaths we (rich, blog-readers in the West) could easily prevent by giving a small amount of our resources?

It doesn't seem like it should matter whether you actually walked past the baby or not; in both cases, you are easily able to prevent the death of an innocent. If it's wrong for you not to in once case, it's wrong in the other case also.

So why aren't you sending more money in foreign aid??

In my experience, if someone disagrees, they object that the situations are actually different: of course they should save the baby from the puddle, but the other case is importantly different somehow, so it's ok for them to keep their money. Then there ensues a back-and-forth about whether the differences between the two situations are really morally important differences.

Once my moral intuitions conflict with those of others, it's easy for doubts about the whole process to creep in:

I have one vague feeling, you have another. How can we really decide who's right? In fact, is there really a right answer, or is it just a matter of opinion?

Most people I talk to are very quick to give up the fight for a real truth-of-the-matter in moral questions. They agree (and even vigorously argue) that morality is totally subjective. It's a mistake to try and find out what's really right and wrong. That would be like trying to find out what's really more delicious: chocolate or vanilla. There is no Truth independent of what people think it is. If I think chocolate is better, that's true for me. If you think vanilla is better, that's true for you. If you talk with me and convince me that vanilla is really better, then that also becomes true of me.

But, of course, most people don't really act in their everyday lives as if morality works like this. They may deny that anything is objectively right or wrong when they're arguing with you, and then try to convince other people to buy "cruelty-free" meat (or go vegetarian). Why? Because it's wrong to inflict suffering on animals, of course. Or they may try to convince their public representatives that it's unfair for them to be required to pay taxes to help the poor; that's money they earned, so they should be able to decide how to spend it. If neither of these examples move you, think for a minute about what cause really motivates you; I think we all have them.

There's more going on in our championing on a cause than simply wanting the world to be a certain way and trying to convince other people. We try to convince each other, not just to get our way, but because we think our way is the right way, and that other people shouldn't just do what we want, but should agree that we're right. If I think about why other people act against my moral causes, I don't think it's because they have different opinions which they have every right to; I think they're too confused or ignorant to see the truth, or too lazy and self-deluded to admit it!

This is just to point out that we treat moral questions differently than we treat questions of taste (like what the best ice-cream is). I can't stand heath ice cream. My wife loves it. I might think that's strange or funny, but I don't think she's confused or wrong about what's good; she's just got a different idea than I do. If I think water-boarding is an appalling practice and you don't, it's very hard for me to adopt the attitude that you just have a different preference than I do. I think that, for some reason, you cannot see or admit the real truth about the practice.

So, if we don't stop to ask ourselves, but covertly watch ourselves in action (to catch ourselves unaware, in our natural habitat), we don't look like we really believe that our moral intuitions are just our opinions. We believe they're really right and that other people should think so too!

Let's look at what research in moral psychology has to say about this. Several psychologists define moral judgements as judgements that we universally hold others accountable to. This is what distinguishes our thinking something's (morally) wrong from just thinking that it's unwise, imprudent, distasteful, etc. So they, too, recognize this fact about our everyday behavior.

Philosophers take this fact and ask "but are we right that there are moral laws that are really universal the way we seem to treat them?"

Psychologists instead recognize that we naturally seem to universalize certain of our judgements. This is different from thinking hard and deciding that there are certain universal principals that we should hold each other accountable to. Instead, certain judgments just strike us as being universally right or wrong.

Noticing this difference, psychologists ask "why is this a natural part of our psychology?" If it's not the result of a considered decision on each of our parts, the answer must lie deeper in a psychology we all share. One answer they've suggested is that we evolved to have this type of judgment because they are effective at helping us create and maintain stable social groups, which improved our chances of survival.

What makes our moral judgments effective in this capacity is merely the fact we think they apply universally; it seems that their content--what we actually think is right and wrong--could vary widely. In other words, you can form just as stable a community with one set of universal principals as with another; it's the fact of their being treated as universal that's important for the social effects.

And, indeed, there not only seems to be disagreement among cultures as to what kinds of behaviors are right or wrong, but also disagreement about what kinds of behaviors should be considered through a moral lens at all. For example, academic discussion of morality tends to focus on issues of fairness and harm, but in many cultures around the world there are strong moral judgements associated with eating, ones relationship to tradition or authority, menstruation, sexual practices, and cultural taboos.

What should we make of this disagreement? I am strongly inclined to think that most traditional cultures are simply mistaken in much of what they consider to be moral questions; but am I really right in this, or is it just an opinion? If menstruating women are prevented from entering the workplace in India, can I rightly condemn that practice as morally wrong?