Here are some examples:
- Morality should be a simply-describable function. The inputs to the function will be actions (or perhaps biographies), and the outputs will be evaluations. The function itself will be describable by a fairly short list of rules.
- Morality involves publicly-expressed reasons. If we judge a certain thing morally good, then we must be able to give an intelligible account of why that thing is good, and what it would take to change that good thing into a bad thing. If we have moral judgments that we can't back up with reasons, then those are not real moral judgments at all, but rather psychological biases or distortions. (I take this to be more or less what Peter Unger thinks, after reading parts of Living High and Letting Die.)
- Morality should judge my individual confrontation with possibilities in the world. If it is right for me to act a certain way, a change in the behavior of those around me can't make it wrong for me to act that way. (This seems absurd to me, but I hear it suggested by classmates, and see it expressed in a more limited domain as the "Compliance Condition" in Liam Murphy's "The Demands of Beneficence".)
- Morality applies only when our actions affect other people.
Probably there are more -- I'll keep collecting them here as I find them. The next questions are which of these make sense to include in our conception of morality, and how we would go about deciding that.
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